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Abstract
We study whether the increased income uncertainty in the US over the last quarter-century
had a negative impact on household welfare by looking at variability of household consumption
growth. We are particularly interested in understanding the eﬀect of greater uncertainty on the
liquidity constrained households. We study the evolution of liquidity constraints in the US in the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, greatly extending Jappelli et al. [1998] methodology on how
to construct such measures using information from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We ﬁnd
that although household indebtedness increased substantially, reﬂecting greater availability of
credit, there was no decline in the proportion of liquidity constrained households between 1983
and 2007. Applying methodology developed in Gorbachev [2009], we ﬁnd that the evolution of
consumption volatility for the liquidity constrained households increased by economically and
statistically more than for the unconstrained households. This increase was lower than that of
family income volatility for these groups. Nevertheless, the welfare cost to society is substantial:
we estimate that an average household would be willing to sacriﬁce 2.35 percent of nondurable
consumption per year to lower consumption risk to its 1984 levels.
∗School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK, corresponding author, email
olga.gorbachev@ed.ac.uk
†Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY USA.
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1 Introduction
In times of great uncertainty, it is important to understand whether vulnerable individuals can
cope. Negative shocks to income may not necessarily translate into welfare losses, even under
incomplete markets, if people can ﬁnd ways to smooth consumption by borrowing at bad times
and paying back at good times. This is because, ultimately, it is consumption that matters for
individuals (Friedman [1957]). Thus, in theory, while individual income became less certain,1
instability of household consumption may have remained unchanged - provided that the households
had access to consumption-smoothing tools, such as savings, credit markets, welfare programs and
other insurance mechanisms.
This paper makes several contributions. First is methodological. Since, to our knowledge,
there is no panel data set that provides information on consumption, income, wealth, and liquidity
constraints, we combine information from several datasets. We document the evolution of liquidity
constraints in the US between 1983 and 2007 based on the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),
providing methodology on how to construct such measures in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). In contrast to Jappelli et al. [1998],2 we allow for changes in credit supply over time by using
the SCF data from diﬀerent years. As the result, the probability of being liquidity constrained may
be diﬀerent in diﬀerent years, even for households with identical characteristics. To our knowledge
this is the ﬁrst such study. We ﬁnd that although household indebtedness increased substantially,
there is no clear decline in the proportion of liquidity constrained households in this period. Our
PSID estimates of liquidity constraints are lower than that in the SCF. Whereas in the SCF on
average 1 in 5 households are denied credit, in the PSID we compute that 3 in 20 are constrained.
Nevertheless, the estimate picks up correctly the trend in the constraints over the 1983-2004 period.
After 1995, credit constraints relaxed for better oﬀ households - those in the upper income quantiles,
and those with more than 12 years of education. By contrast, for poorer households, and those
with less education, the probability of being denied credit remained the same or even increased
after 1998, and the percentage of such households without a credit card also increased. Finally,
according to all indicators, poorer households, single parents and nonwhites, particularly those with
1See for example Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994, 1998, 2002], Gottschalk and Moﬃtt [2009], Dynarski and Gruber
[1997], Haider [2001], Hacker [2006], Dynan et al. [2007], Keys [2008], Shin and Solon [2008], Jensen and Shore [2008].
2To our knowledge Jappelli et al. [1998] was the ﬁrst to construct liquidity constraints in the PSID using SCF
data and to study their evolution and impact on consumption smoothing.
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12 or less years of education, are still the most likely to be constrained, and there is no evidence
that liquidity constraints slackened for these groups.
Second, we assess the development of income shocks for liquidity constrained and unconstrained
households. We distinguish the evolution of total family income variability from that of total labor
income variability, as family income includes public and private transfers, labor, business and asset
income from all working adults. We ﬁnd that family income volatility increased by 43 percent
between 1983 and 2004, while total labor volatility did not change. This divergence of trends
can be attributed to a substantial increase in business and asset income volatility. The biggest
increase in total family income volatility was experienced by households on welfare and nonwhite
households with low education (less than 13 years). Family income volatility increased by 71 percent
(or 16ppts.) for these households between 1983 and 2004, whereas it went up by half as much (or
8ppts.) for non welfare recipients and white households. Increased income variability contributed
to the increased demand for debt and thus to the tightening of the liquidity constraints in the
market of great ﬁnancial liberalization.
Third, we apply methodology developed in Gorbachev [2009] to document the evolution of
consumption volatility for the liquidity constrained and unconstrained households, and to study
the role played by the changes in liquidity constraints on transmission of income shocks. We ﬁnd
that consumption volatility also increased over this sample in line with income volatility but by a
smaller percentage. Rising income volatility and tightening liquidity constraints, led to a higher
increase in consumption volatility for liquidity constrained households. We found that all liquidity
constrained households, regardless of their other characteristics, experienced a similar increase in
volatility of food consumption, though this increase was signiﬁcantly lower than that of volatility of
family income for these groups. The increase in volatility of consumption for liquidity constrained
households supports the claims that transitory shocks to income in the US increased over this time
period.
Since food consumption is well known to have low income elasticity, (see for example, Bunkers
and Cochrane [1957]), the results presented in this study are a lower bound of what might have
actually happened to volatility of total nondurable consumption. Blundell et al. [2008] estimate
a demand equation for food as a function of relative prices, as well as nondurable expenditure
and a host of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the household. The elasticity of
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food consumption with respect to nondurable consumption is 0.85 and statistically signiﬁcant.
Thus a 1 percent change in nondurable consumption will lead to a 0.85 percent change in food
expenditure. Therefore, a 1 percent increase in volatility of food consumption will translate into
a 1.38 = 1/(0.85)2 percent increase in volatility of nondurable consumption. This again is an
underestimate if we consider that the elasticity changes over time and that this change appears to
be positive.
As greater income uncertainty may not necessarily translate into welfare losses, having a good
measure of the volatility of household consumption is thus fundamental to assessing whether, and
to what extent, welfare was aﬀected by increased income shocks.3 Gorbachev [2009] developed
such a measure. After accounting for predictable variation arising from movements in real interest
rates, family composition and structure, changes in demographics, income shocks, measurement
errors, and nonseparability of preferences, and using data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), Gorbachev showed that volatility of
household expenditure on food, and on nondurables in general, in the US increased by 20 percent
between 1970 and 2004 for liquidity unconstrained households. This increase was especially pro-
nounced for nonwhite households with no more than 12 years of education; in contrast, households
with more than 12 years of education saw a signiﬁcantly smaller increase in volatility, irrespective
of race.
Since these ﬁndings were based on a liquidity unconstrained sample of households, identiﬁed
on the basis of their wealth holdings, Gorbachev [2009] could not evaluate the extend to which
liquidity constrained households were adversely aﬀected by the increased income uncertainty. As
liquidity constrained households are typically poorer households, single parents and nonwhites,
especially those with 12 or less years of education, the ﬁndings on increased consumption volatility
of unconstrained households are insuﬃcient for a proper welfare analysis. If one also keeps in mind
the negative externalities for society that arise out of poverty and discontent, such as for example
increased crime, a study of the welfare of liquidity constrained households becomes essential.
3A word of caution is in order here: we are not studying changes in inequality of consumption, which concerns
itself with the widening of the distribution of consumption levels. Instead, we are interested in examining changes
in variability of consumption growth rates, as a measure of volatility of consumption. Changes in volatility of
consumption enter welfare calculations directly, whereas changes in inequality do not necessarily aﬀect social welfare
unless one makes normative claims.
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It is reasonable to believe that since liquidity unconstrained households experienced a signiﬁ-
cant increase in volatility, liquidity constrained households would have experienced an even larger
increase, as these households, by deﬁnition, were unable to borrow to smooth out the shocks. How-
ever, without direct measures of liquidity constraints, it is problematic to make statements on the
evolution of consumption risk for liquidity constrained households as the changes in the unpre-
dictable shocks to consumption could be due either to changes in liquidity constraints aﬀecting
households’ ability to achieve their desired consumption, or to shocks directly aﬀecting households’
desired consumption (for example, shocks to permanent income). Diﬀerences in the origins of
variability are thus important for our welfare analysis.
Volatility for liquidity constrained households might not have increased by more than that of
unconstrained households, as these households might have had opportunities to smooth consump-
tion through receipt of public transfers. In addition, there are strong a priori grounds for expecting
that liquidity constraints relaxed over the period under consideration, and information on wealth
holdings might not have been enough to pick up on this trend. Increased use of credit scoring,
risk-based pricing and product diﬀerentiation allowed household debt to nearly triple in real terms,
and facilitated a subprime lending boom, particularly in the mortgage market, which explicitly
targeted traditionally excluded households. However, according to recent work by Dogra [2009],
who uses data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, the proportion of households unable to bor-
row as much as they would like actually slightly increased over the 1983-2007 period. We ﬁnd that
rising income volatility and tightening liquidity constraints, led to a higher increase in consumption
volatility for liquidity constrained households. All liquidity constrained households, regardless of
their other characteristics, experienced a similar increase in volatility of food consumption, though
this increase was signiﬁcantly lower than that of volatility of family income for these groups.
The rest of the paper is organized into three parts. Part II provides a brief review of the liter-
ature on liquidity constraints; quickly describes the SCF data and presents estimates of evolution
of liquidity constraints and debt over time; presents and estimates a model relating liquidity con-
straints to household characteristics, and discusses the assumptions necessary to invert the SCF
liquidity measures into the PSID within the standard consumption model; and presents results
on the evolution of liquidity constraints in the PSID sample. Part III presents the evolution of
income volatility for liquidity constrained and unconstrained households for all the subcategories
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of total family income, total labor, business and asset income, and public and private transfers;
and discusses these trends. Part IV constructs volatility of household consumption for the liq-
uidity constrained and unconstrained households; documents its evolution; and discusses the role
changes in liquidity constraints played in transmission of income shocks for these households. Part
V concludes.
2 Liquidity Constraints
Consumption is more sensitive to current income if consumers are liquidity constrained: that is,
they cannot borrow as much as they would like, subject to their intertemporal budget constraint,
and therefore cannot completely smooth consumption over time. This possibility led several authors
to test for the presence of liquidity constraints. Zeldes [1989] was one of the ﬁrst to use information
on wealth in the PSID to split the sample into constrained and unconstrained households, and
found that liquidity constraints were binding for low wealth households.4 However, the sample
splitting approach is not ideal as a method for accurately identifying which households are liquidity
constrained. For example, Runkle [1991], using a similar approach, does not ﬁnd evidence of
liquidity constraints.
Another approach to identifying liquidity constrained households is to use direct information
on loan rejections or on consumer reactions to changes in their borrowing limit. Gross and Souleles
[2002], using data on credit card accounts to identify liquidity constrained households, ﬁnd that the
’marginal propensity to consume out of liquidity’ is on average 10-14%, and for bankcard accounts
with balances above 90% of their credit limits, it is almost 50%. Attanasio and Kyriazidou [2008],
use micro data on car loans, document that consumers as a whole are more responsive to loan
maturity than interest rates, especially low-income consumers. Similarly, W. Adams and J.Levin
[2009] ﬁnd evidence of liquidity constraints in the auto sales market: demand is highly responsive
to changes in the minimum down-payment required, and is 50% higher during tax rebate season.
However, these studies by their nature do not investigate whether the proportion of households
facing binding liquidity constraints has changed over time.
Many authors have used the Survey of Consumer Finances in order to investigate liquidity
4In particular, Zeldes [1989] found that, for low wealth households, consumption growth responded to changes in
current income.
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constraints. As well as detailed information on households’ assets and liabilities, the survey contains
direct information on whether households face binding credit constraints. Jappelli [1990] was the
ﬁrst to use direct information on credit constraints, available in the 1983 Survey of Consumer
Finances, to determine what proportion of US households were liquidity constrained. He also
determined what factors inﬂuence whether a household is constrained, by estimating a logit model
relating the probability of being constrained to the characteristics of borrowers and lenders.
More relevant to our paper is the work by Fissel and Jappelli [1990]. They study whether the
fraction of households that are liquidity constrained has changed over time. They estimate a logit
model following Jappelli [1990] using the SCF 1983 data, and then use the estimated coeﬃcients to
impute the probability of being constrained in a sample from the PSID (1969-1982) (which contains
the same explanatory variables, but no direct information on liquidity constraints). However, a
limitation of this approach is that it assumes that the relationship between the probability of being
constrained and the characteristics of borrowers and lenders does not change over time.
We estimate the probability of being liquidity constrained using a probit model. We start with
a simple speciﬁcation used by Jappelli et al. [1998], and improve on it by estimating the probability
of being constrained separately for each year that the SCF data is available. Thus, unlike Jappelli
et al. [1998] we allow for changes in credit supply over time by using the SCF data from each
available year (1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007), so that the probability of
being liquidity constrained may be diﬀerent in diﬀerent years, even for households with identical
characteristics. We use these estimates to obtain a time-varying measure of liquidity constraints.
We then use variables common to the PSID and the SCF to invert these estimates and compute
liquidity constraints for the PSID households for 1983 to 2004 period.
2.1 Data
2.1.1 Survey of Consumer Finances
The 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF),
sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, are cross-sectional surveys of
the balance sheet, pension, income, and other demographic characteristics of U.S. families.
The SCF collects data from two samples: a standard multistage area-probability sample selected
from the 48 contiguous US states, and a list sample designed to disproportionately sample wealthy
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families. For example, 3,007 of the 4,522 interviews for the 2004 SCF were from the area probability
sample, and 1,515 were from the list sample. Except in 1983, the SCF public-use dataset does not
identify which households come from which sample, therefore the total sample is not representative
of US households. The SCF provides a set of probability weights which account for the sample
design, and also for diﬀerential patterns of non-response among families with diﬀerent characteristics
(B. Bucks and Moore [2006]).
Econometricians and statisticians dispute whether sample weights should be used in regression
(see Deaton [1997]). Using sample weights will make the estimates look like those that would be
estimated using a representative panel. If the estimated model is viewed as a structural relationship,
however, these estimates are not meaningful. If the model’s parameters diﬀer across strata of
the population, even weighted estimates are inconsistent for the true, heterogeneous population
parameters; if they do not, unweighted regression is consistent and eﬃcient. If regression is seen as
a tool to describe the population, however, sample weights should be used. Since we only estimate
a reduced-form model, we use the sample weights in all regressions, as well as when calculating
summary statistics, unless otherwise stated.
Over 1989-2007, the SCF uses a multiple imputation method to account for missing data.
For each piece of missing data, the SCF provides 5, possibly diﬀerent, responses (referred to as
“implicates”), resulting in a data set with 5 times the actual number of households. Lindamood
et al. (2007) report that using only one implicate may bias results; ideally, all implicates should
be used according to the “repeated-imputation inference” method. However, since using all 5
implicates renders the standard errors automatically calculated by Stata invalid, we average across
all ﬁve implicates.
The core sample consists of heads of households (both female and male) who are not students
and are not retired. We keep households whose head is at least 25 years old but less than 65. Table
1 provides summary statistics for our the SCF sample, including the summary statistics for the
constrained and the unconstrained households based on the denied credit variable discussed below.
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2.1.2 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The PSID is the only cross-sectional time-series survey that collects data on household consump-
tion.5 Consumption data in the PSID are limited to food and shelter. We compute all the con-
sumption volatility measures on food consumption calculated as a sum of food consumed at home
plus away from home plus food stamps received. Our utility speciﬁcation will allow for the non-
separability of food consumption from other nondurable consumption goods in the utility function.
Since food consumption is well known to have low income elasticity, (see for example, Bunkers and
Cochrane [1957]), the results presented in this study are a lower bound of what might have actually
happened to volatility of total nondurable consumption.
The core PSID sample contains data from 1968 to 2005, and consists of heads of households
(both female and male) who are not students and are not retired. We keep households whose head
is at least 25 years old but less than 65. We drop all the households that belonged to the Latino or
Immigrant samples, and those that were drawn from the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO).
Households that report negative or zero food consumption levels (that is a sum of food at home
plus away from home plus food stamps) are also eliminated. In order to minimize eﬀects of outliers
on the results, we follow the literature by dropping households who report more than 500 percent
change in family income or food consumption over a one year period as well as those whose income
or consumption fall by more than 100 percent.
The most important issue to note regarding the data is that it became biennial after 1997. We
construct a hypothetical biennial sample to study the evolution of consumption volatility up to
2004. Since income and consumption data is collected for previous year, the biennial sample has
data for all even years from 1970 to 2004. In fact, it is the limitations in consumption data that
render the sample length so short. Food consumption data is available for years 1968 to 1972, 1974
5The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) collects a more comprehensive inventory of consumption data, but
its structure as a repeated cross-section makes it impossible to construct individual volatility measures that track
volatility for the same household over periods of time longer than one year. Current work on inequality utilizes
CEX data by constructing synthetic cohorts. This strategy is inappropriate here as our main concern is to provide
a measure of temporal volatility for each household. Synthetic cohort techniques would require aggregation within
cohorts, which in itself introduces a lot of data smoothing, and is exactly what we want to avoid. It is unclear
whether this extra information will bring more beneﬁt than cost, as it will introduce extra model uncertainty. Thus,
interpretation of results on evolution of residuals squared might not be as clear cut as they are now.
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to 1986, 1989 to 1996 and biennial thereafter. Since we are computing biennial growth rates, we
have one data point for 1970 and one for 1972, then 1976 to 1986, 1992 to 2004. Income data has
no gaps and is available from 1968 to 2004. Because the SCF data begins in 1983, and the PSID
data we have ends in 2004, our sample starts from 1983 and ends in 2004.
2.2 Evolution of Liquidity Constraints Over Time
Figure 1: Percentage of households with debt or credit card.
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Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
US household debt has undergone an extraordinary expansion over the past three decades.
As Figure 1 illustrates, between 1983 and 2007, the percentage of households holding some debt
went from 70% to 77%. Credit card ownership also expanded over this period. The percentage of
households owning a credit card increased from 65% in 1983 to a peak of 76% in 2001, before falling
slightly to 73% in 2007. The increase in credit card ownership was particularly marked among the
poorest 20% of households, rising from 26% to 42% between 1983 and 2007. The composition of
credit card holders changed to include more traditionally excluded households: 21% of card holders
were nonwhite in 2007, compared to only 12% in 1983; 9% were single parents in 2007, compared
to 6% in 1983. Card holders also tended to come from a lower income quintile in 2007. Black
and Morgan [1999] and Bird et al. [1999] argue that between 1983 and 1995, credit card access
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expanded to include riskier and poorer borrowers; these results conﬁrm that the expansion was
maintained after 1995. Although credit card debt only accounts for 3% of total debt, it increased
by 270% over this period.
Figure 2: Increase in average debt, in 1983 dollars
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Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
Figure 2 shows that the mean real debt for all households increased by 170%, from $17,000 to
$47,000 (in 1983 dollars), between 1983 and 2007. This is largely an expansion of mortgage debt:
70% of debt is secured against the household’s primary residence, and mortgage debt accounts for
80% of the increase in average debt between 1983 and 2007. However, average non-mortgage debt
nearly doubled, increasing from $7,700 to $13,200 in real terms (two thirds of this increase concerns
debt secured against other residential property).6 For those households with some debt, the median
amount of debt held increased from $11,000 in 1983 to $33,000 in 2007 (in 1983 dollars).
The literature attributes this expansion of credit to changes in the supply of credit. Legislation,
starting with the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, increased
the competitiveness of consumer lending (see Campbell and Hercowitz [2009]). Innovations in the
credit market not only reduced costs in general, but also expanded access to traditionally excluded
consumers. The increased use of statistical credit scores since the mid-1990s (the 1970s in the case
6See Figure 8 in the Appendix and Dogra [2009] for a detailed analysis of these facts.
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of credit cards) may have facilitated lending to consumers whose credit quality would otherwise
be hard to discern (e.g. ﬁrst-time buyers). Increased product diﬀerentiation has allowed lenders
to mitigate adverse selection problems, and to accommodate the needs of consumers with low
current income: in particular, mortgages with lower required down-payments have allowed low
wealth consumers to become homeowners (see Doms and Krainer [2007]). Finally, increased use of
risk-based pricing has allowed the expansion of subprime lending in the mortgage, auto loan and
credit card markets, which explicitly targets less creditworthy households (see Belsky and Essene
[2008]).
Figure 3: Proportion of liquidity constrained households
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Note: solid line indicates the average proportion of liquidity constrained households based on denied credit measure;
dashed lines provide 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Given these trends, and the expansion of debt and access to credit described above, we might ex-
pect liquidity constraints to have relaxed over this period, particularly for traditionally constrained
groups such as low income and ethnic minority families. However, an increase in debt does not
imply that more consumers can obtain as much as they desire. If, for example, consumers’ demand
for debt has increased in line with the supply of credit, the stock of consumer liabilities might
increase, while the proportion of households unable to borrow as much as they desire remains the
same, or increases. This is in fact what we observe.
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Figure 3 demonstrates that there is no clear decline in the proportion of liquidity constrained
households between 1983 and 2007. If anything, the proportion of households denied credit tends
to increase, rising by 8 percentage points between 1983 and 1995, then remaining roughly constant
until 2007. As expected, the proportion denied credit is slightly counter-cyclical, showing its
largest increases in 1992 (after the 1990-1991 recession) and 2004 (after the 2001 recession). (The
proportion of households with assets less than two months’ income also shows a marked rise and
then decline around the 1990-1991 recession.) The increase in loan rejections is most marked for
single parents and whites with 12 years or less education, and for the poorest 40% of households:
all these groups show a sustained increase in loan rejections across the whole period. For whites
with more than 12 years of education, by contrast, the increase in loan rejections is reversed after
1995, falling from a peak of 21% in 1995 to 15% in 2007. Among the richest 60% of households,
the proportion denied credit shows a similar decline after 1995 or 1998,(see Figures 9, 10, and 11
in the Appendix).
Another indicator of availability of credit is credit card holdings. We ﬁnd that while the pro-
portion without a credit card or line of credit trends downwards between 1989 and 2001, falling by
5 percentage points, it shows no clear trend over the period as a whole. The increase in credit card
ownership, especially between 1989 and 2001, is particularly marked among poorer households.
Among households in the lowest income quintile, the percentage with out a credit card or line of
credit fell from 66% to 45% between 1989 and 2001. However, this expansion of credit appears
to have reversed for poorer households after 2001: the proportion without a credit card increases
by 10 percentage points for both the lowest and the second lowest quantiles. The increase in loan
rejections over this period also appears to be highest for poorer households: the proportion denied
credit rises by 9 percentage points for the lowest quintile, and by 6 percentage points for the second
lowest.
Finally, according to all indicators, availability of a line of credit and credit card holdings, poorer
households, single parents and nonwhites, particularly those with 12 or less years of education, are
the most likely to be constrained, as we would expect. There is no evidence that liquidity constraints
slackened for these groups in particular.
In general, there is no clear decline in the proportion of liquidity constrained households between
1983 and 2007. It appears that credit constraints tightened for all households until the mid-90s
13
- despite a signiﬁcant expansion of credit card ownership, especially among the poorest 20% of
households. After 1995 and 1998, credit constraints appear to have relaxed for better oﬀ households
- those in the upper income quantiles, and those with more than 12 years of education. By contrast,
for poorer households, and those with less education, the probability of being denied credit remained
the same or even increased after 1998, and the percentage of such households without a credit card
also increased.
2.3 Estimating Constraints in the PSID
We construct an indicator of liquidity constraints within the SCF sample, following Jappelli et al.
[1998], based on the following questions asked by the SCF:
1. “In the past ﬁve years, has a particular lender or creditor turned down any request you (or
your [husband/wife]) made for credit, or not given you as much credit as you applied for?”
2. “Were you later able to obtain the full amount you (or your husband/wife) requested by
reapplying to the same institution or by applying elsewhere?”
3. “Was there any time in the past ﬁve years that you (or your [husband/wife]) thought of
applying for credit at a particular place, but changed your mind because you thought you
might be turned down?”
Following Jappelli [1990] and Duca and Rosenthal [1994], we count a household as liquidity
constrained if either it had a request for credit turned down and it was not able to obtain the
full amount by reapplying or applying elsewhere, or if it was discouraged from applying because
it though it would be turned down. To estimate the probability of being denied credit, we use
information on:
a spline function for age, dummies for a nonwhite respondent or female head of house-
hold, marital status (married/ widow/ divorced) and being a single parent, 6 dummies
for education, 2 dummies for the number of adults, 3 dummies for the number of kids;
dummies for self-employment, receiving welfare payments, unemployment, having any
positive asset income; dummies for occupation; log household disposable income, its
square, and its cube; annual hours worked; the log of (household mortgage +1) and its
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square, log (annual mortgage payment+1) and its square, log (asset income+1) and its
square, log (house value+1) and its square, interactions between education and unem-
ployment and between race and number of children, having positive asset income and
being a single parent.
Table 2 presents our estimation results on the SCF data. Since the ﬁrst-stage model is only
a reduced-form expression which does not distinguish factors aﬀecting the demand and supply of
credit, the estimated coeﬃcients presented in Table 2 do not have a straightforward interpretation:
here we are more concerned with accurately predicting the probability of being constrained in the
PSID. Nonetheless, the results obtained broadly accord with economic theory and the results of
previous studies. Single parents and nonwhite, working heads of household with low education
are more likely to be constrained. Individuals with only a high school degree were signiﬁcantly
more likely to be constrained than those with a college degree, whereas those with more than 16
years of education were much less likely to be constrained. Higher family income decreases the
probability of being constrained. This concurs with previous studies (although it is not obvious
a priori, because our model does not distinguish transitory income, which should unambiguously
decrease the probability of being constrained, and permanent income, which has an ambiguous
eﬀect).
To check the robustness of the results to use of the survey weights, we estimate the model both
with and without survey weights. We also check for stability of coeﬃcients and show that most
important variables (in terms of economic importance) vary over time. For details see Table 3.
Accordingly, the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients from these regressions, depending on the test results, are
allowed to vary over time or are ﬁxed to be time invariant, are then used to impute the probability
of being liquidity constrained for households in the PSID sample. For each year of the PSID
observations, we impute the probability of being constrained using the coeﬃcients estimated using
the nearest subsequent year of the SCF data.
One problem we encounter is the scarcity of appropriate explanatory variables common to both
the PSID and the SCF samples. Jappelli et al. [1998] state that the variables used to predict the
probability of being constrained in the ﬁrst stage regression should include all dependent variables in
the second stage regression. If variables which aﬀect the probability of being liquidity constrained,
and enter the Euler equation estimated in the second stage, are omitted from the ﬁrst stage regres-
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sion, then the second stage parameter estimates will be inconsistent. In particular, the probability
of being constrained may be diﬀerent for households with diﬀerent rates of time preference (because
less patient households will demand more consumption today, have a higher desired debt, and be
more likely to be constrained). The discount factor is accounted for in the second stage estimation
by the household ﬁxed eﬀect, but is not accounted for in the ﬁrst stage SCF regression, as the SCF
is not a panel. This is potentially a serious problem, as the ﬁxed eﬀect will pick up some variation
in the dependent variable that should be attributed to liquidity constraints, and the second stage
parameter estimates will be inconsistent. We remedy the above problem, by proxying ﬁxed eﬀects
with several household speciﬁc variables that do not change over time, such as race, education, sex,
birth cohort. We also include interactions of these with time varying variables in order to account
for correlations between for example discount factors and liquidity constraints.
A related issue is that, in order to use, say, data relating to 1989 to predict the probability of
being constrained in 1988, 1987 or 1986, we need to control for aggregate shocks. We would expect
the probability of being constrained to be much higher in recessions. (This problem is mitigated
to some extent by the fact that the SCF asks whether households were constrained in the last 5
years, which may average out cyclical ﬂuctuations to some extent). We address this problem by
including region speciﬁc variables, such as the unemployment rate, in the ﬁrst stage regressions.
Although changes in the national unemployment rate would be picked up by the constant term, we
can exploit variation in regional unemployment rates to control for region speciﬁc aggregate shocks.
Finally, the measures of liquidity constraints used in the SCF are less than ideal. Whereas we
require an estimate of whether a household is currently constrained, based on its current character-
istics, the denied credit indicator only reports whether a household has ever been constrained in the
past 5 years. It might also appear that this indicator overestimates the proportion of constrained
households, since some individuals may apply for multiple loans, be rejected for some, but still
be able to obtain as much credit as they desire. However, as described above, we exclude such
households by counting as unconstrained those households who reported that they were later able
to obtain the full amount of credit they desired by reapplying or borrowing elsewhere.
Figure 4 compares estimated constraints in the PSID to actual constraints in the SCF. Two-
sample estimation depends on the assumption that both samples are drawn from the same pop-
ulation. As Table 4 shows, the SCF and the PSID samples are broadly similar, although there
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Figure 4: Mean Estimated Probabilities in the SCF and the PSID for Denied Credit Constraint
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Source: Survey of the Consumer Finances and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
are some diﬀerences, which may explain why the average SCF household is about 5 percentage
points more likely to be constrained. The SCF sample has more welfare recipients and households
headed by self-employed or nonwhite individuals than the PSID sample: this makes the average
SCF household more likely to be constrained according to our estimated model. The average PSID
household also has more asset income and higher mortgage payments than the average SCF house-
hold, which decreases the probability of being constrained. As long as the relationship between the
probability of being constrained and the explanatory variables is the same in both samples, these
diﬀerences do not imply that the estimate of this probability is inaccurate. The estimated percent-
age of constrained households in the PSID and the actual percentage of constrained households in
the SCF also display the same trend, which further suggests that our estimates are accurate.
3 Evolution of Income Shocks
The above ﬁndings indicate that credit constraints tightened for all households until the mid-
90s - despite a signiﬁcant expansion of credit card ownership, especially among the poorest 20%
of households, and that for poorer households, and those with less education, the probability of
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being denied credit remained the same or even increased after 1998. As the ﬁrst step towards
understanding whether and/or how the welfare of vulnerable households was aﬀected in the last
25 years, we look at the evolution of income volatility. We assume for simplicity, (and due to
lack of more complete data), that the sole relevant source of uncertainty faced by the consumer is
family income uncertainty. As in Blundell et al. [2008], we assume that the income process for each
household ℎ is:
푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡) = 푍
′
ℎ,푎,푡휗푡 + 푃ℎ,푎,푡 + 휈ℎ,푎,푡 (1)
where 푎 and 푡 index age and time respectively, 푌 is real income, and 푍 is a set of income
characteristics observable and anticipated by consumers, that is allowed to change over time. In
individual labor income models, these regressors are usually proxied by age, age squared, dummy
variables for education, occupation and industry categories, and interactions between age, age
squared and education, sex and race indicators, cohort dummies, time dummies (to control for
aggregate shocks), and interaction terms. Since in the present case we are interested in the family
income process, we redeﬁne these parameters as those pertaining to the head of household, and
include additional parameters, such as head’s marital status, number of hours worked by head and
his partner, and the number of children in the household.
Equation (1) decomposes the remainder of income into a permanent component 푃ℎ,푎,푡 and a
transitory or mean-reverting component, 휈ℎ,푎,푡. By writing 푌ℎ,푎,푡 rather than 푌ℎ,푡 we emphasize the
importance of cohort eﬀects in the evolution of earnings over the life-cycle.
For consistency with previous empirical studies7, we assume that the permanent component
푃ℎ,푎,푡 follows a martingale process of the form:
푃ℎ,푎,푡 = 푃ℎ,푎,푡−1 + 휍ℎ,푎,푡 (2)
where 휍ℎ,푎,푡 is serially uncorrelated, and the transitory component 휈ℎ,푎,푡 that follows an MA(q)
process. It follows that unexplained income growth can be computed from:
Δ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡) = ˆΔ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡) + 휍ℎ,푎,푡 +Δ휈ℎ,푎,푡 (3)
7This is a standard model of the income process, see for example MaCurdy [1982], Hall and Mishkin [1982], Abowd
and Card [1986], Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994]; or Banks et al. [2001] and Meghir and Pistaferri [2004] for more recent
studies.
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The volatility of income will be measure as a square of the unexplained income growth component,
which is composed of household speciﬁc shocks to permanent and transitory income.
휎2ℎ,푎,푡 =
(
휍ℎ,푎,푡 +Δ휈ℎ,푎,푡
)2
=
(
Δ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡)− ˆΔ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡)
)2
(4)
The volatility of income, 휎2ℎ,푎,푡, is thus composed of household speciﬁc shocks to permanent and
transitory family income.
Figure 5: Mean Volatility of Income Shocks, 1984 to 2004.
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By now it is well documented that volatility of individual male earnings increased substantially
from the 1970s to early 1980s, was stable in the 1980s to early 1990s, and began to increase again
since the mid 1990s.8 Volatility of family income, both its permanent and transitory components,
8See for example, Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994, 1998, 2002], ?, Dynarski and Gruber [1997], Haider [2001], Hacker
[2006], Dynan et al. [2007], Keys [2008], Shin and Solon [2008], Jensen and Shore [2008].
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also increased substantially since 1970s.9
Figure 5 illustrates volatility of family income versus that of total labor income, income from
public transfers, and other income, for our biennial sample. As mentioned, this measure of volatility
does not distinguish between permanent and transitory shocks to income. Additionally, since the
sample is biennial, volatility presented here, is a smoothed out version of annual volatility series.10
Total labor income is the sum of labor income of all working adults in the household. Family income
is the sum of total labor income, plus public and private transfer payments, plus business and asset
income.11 Income from public transfers includes AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps programs, income
from SSI and SS beneﬁts, unemployment and workmen compensation beneﬁts. Other income is
the diﬀerence between family income, labor income and income from public transfers. It is evident
from the graphs that volatility of family income is lower than that of labor income, as we would
expect given that family income includes public and private transfers, though other income (which is
primarily business and asset income) is much more volatile, and its volatility increased dramatically
over the sample period.
Tables 5 to 8 provide results on the diﬀerences in the trends in income volatility by diﬀerent
categories. As Table 5 illustrates, total labor income volatility increased between 1984 and 2004.
This was also true for single parents. On the other hand, labor income volatility actually fell for
married households and for households with less than 13 years of education.
Unlike labor income, family income volatility, increased signiﬁcantly, rising by 43 percent (or
8ppts.) over 1984-2004 period. This diﬀerence is a result of a much higher increase in volatility of
other income (as can be seen from Table 8). Households on welfare and nonwhite households with
low education (less than 13 years) experienced the largest increase in volatility of household family
income. Family income volatility increased by 71 percent (or 16ppts.) for these households between
1984 and 2004, whereas it went up by 8ppts. for non welfare recipients and white households. Thus,
race and education played an important role in evolution of income volatility. The association
between welfare payments and volatility of family income should be read with caution as here
we are describing correlations rather than causal relationships. It is reasonable to assume that
9See for example Dynan et al. [2007], Keys [2008], Shin and Solon [2008], Jensen and Shore [2008], and Gorbachev
[2009].
10Volatility computed on annual growth rates behaves in the same way as described by the already cited studies.
11Business income is a sum of rental, room and board income, self-employment, farm income and other activities.
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households that experienced high volatility of family income turned to public transfers to smooth
consumption; of course, not all such households would have received public transfers. It is also
worth pointing out that increase in income shocks could have on contributed to the increased
demand for credit and thus to the tightening of the liquidity constraint during our sample period.
4 Welfare Implications of Increased Income Volatility and Tighter
Liquidity Constraints.
4.1 A Consumption Model
In the absence of perfect insurance, households are unable to insure against income shocks, with the
consequence that an increase in unanticipated risk would directly increase volatility of consumption
especially if households have limited ability to smooth out these shocks. Since families desire to
smooth consumption, such an increase in volatility would have a negative impact on welfare, other
things being equal. Thus, it is critical to study changes in variability of household consumption.
Consumption growth varies with preferences or demographics, the risk free interest rate, antic-
ipated income shocks, cash-on-hand relative to future wealth, and idiosyncratic risk. To see this,
consider a typical Euler equation.
퐸푡
[
푈 ′(퐶ℎ,푡+1; 휃ℎ,푡+1)(1 + 푟ℎ,푡+1)
푈 ′(퐶ℎ,푡; 휃ℎ,푡)(1 + 훿ℎ)
]
(1 + 휆ℎ,푡+1) = 1 (5)
where ℎ stands for household and 푡 for time; 퐶ℎ,푡 is real consumption of family ℎ in period 푡; 휃ℎ,푡
are family ℎ′푠 tastes; 훿ℎ is its rate of time preference and is assumed to be household speciﬁc but
time invariant; 퐸푡 is the expectation operator, conditional on information available at time 푡; 푟ℎ,푡+1
is the ex post real return on risk free asset held by family ℎ between periods 푡 and 푡 + 1; 휆ℎ,푡+1
is the extra utility that would result from borrowing an extra dollar, consuming it, and reducing
consumption the next period accordingly to repay the debt. If 휆ℎ,푡+1 > 0, the liquidity constraint
is binding and the family cannot borrow, and thus will have to consume out of current assets.
In order to allow for precautionary savings and nonseparability of preferences between con-
sumption of food and other nondurables,12 and to be able to take the model to the data, we assume
12As pointed out by example Attanasio and Weber [1995], Meghir and Weber [1996], Banks et al. [1997] it is
important to control for nonseparability of food consumption relative to consumption of other goods.
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that the utility function takes the constant relative risk aversion form, such that
푈(푂ℎ,푡, 퐹ℎ,푡; 휃ℎ,푡) = 푒
휃ℎ,푡
[푂훼ℎ,푡퐹 훽ℎ,푡
1− 훾
]1−훾
(6)
where 퐹ℎ,푡 is food consumption and 푂ℎ,푡 is consumption of other nondurable goods, such that
푝퐹푡 퐹ℎ,푡 + 푝
푂
푡 푂ℎ,푡 = 퐶ℎ,푡; 훼 and 훽 are share parameters measuring the importance of consumption
of other nondurable goods relative to food and visa versa; and 훾 controls the degree of relative risk
aversion.13
The above Euler equations with respect to food consumption:
퐸푡
[
푝퐹푡 푈퐹 (푂ℎ,푡+1, 퐹ℎ,푡+1; 휃ℎ,푡+1)(1 + 푟ℎ,푡+1)
푝퐹푡+1푈퐹 (푂ℎ,푡, 퐹ℎ,푡; 휃ℎ,푡)(1 + 훿ℎ)
]
(1 + 휆ℎ,푡+1) = 1 (7)
Using functional form for the utility function, and 2nd order Taylor approximation of the above
Euler equation,14 we can show that the growth rate of household food consumption, Δ푙푛(퐹ℎ,푡+1),
is a function of anticipated changes in demographics or preferences Δ휃ℎ,푡+1 and risk free interest
rate 푙푛(1 + 푟ℎ,푡+1), the shadow price of borrowing an extra dollar 푙푛(1 + 휆ℎ,푡+1), personal dis-
count rate 푙푛(1 + 훿ℎ), on changes in food prices, Δ푙푛푝
퐹
푡+1, on price diﬀerential between inﬂation in
food and other nondurables, Δ푙푛푝푂푡+1 −Δ푙푛푝
퐹
푡+1, on precautionary saving motive, 푉푡휖ℎ,푡+1, and on
idiosyncratic shocks to consumption growth, 휍ℎ,푡+1.
13The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion with this utility speciﬁcation is given by −퐹푈퐹퐹
푈퐹
= 1−훽(1−훾). Intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution for food consumption is pinned down by 1
훽(1−훾)−1
. The assumption of the iso-elastic
form for the utility function means that, in a world without uncertainty, an increase in lifetime wealth will lead to a
proportionate increase in consumption. This form also assumes that utility is time additive.
14Attanasio and Low [2004] show that a log-linearized Euler equation for consumption yields consistent estimates
of the preference parameters when utility is isoelastic and a sample covers a long time period. The requirement on
the length of the panel is imposed in order to tackle estimation problems that arise due to the presence of liquidity
constraints.
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Δ푙푛퐹ℎ,푡+1 =
1
1− (1− 훾)(훼+ 훽)
[
Δ휃ℎ,푡+1 + 푙푛(1 + 푟ℎ,푡+1) + 푙푛(1 + 휆ℎ,푡+1) + 푙푛(1 + 훿ℎ)
]
−
1
1− (1− 훾)(훼+ 훽)
[
Δ푙푛푝퐹푡+1 + 훼(1− 훾)(Δ푙푛푝
푂
푡+1 −Δ푙푛푝
퐹
푡+1)
]
+ 푧ℎ,푡+1 (8)
where
푧ℎ,푡+1 =
훼(1 − 훾)− 1
(1− 훽(1− 훾))(1 − (1− 훾)(훼 + 훽))
[
휍퐹ℎ,푡+1 −
푉푡휖
퐹
ℎ,푡+1
2
]
−
훽훼(1− 훾)2
(1− 훽(1− 훾))(1 − (1− 훾)(훼 + 훽))
[
휍푂ℎ,푡+1 +
푉푡휖
푂
ℎ,푡+1
2
]
= 휍ℎ,푡+1 −
푉푡휖ℎ,푡+1
2
The estimation strategy allows for household ﬁxed eﬀects to account for household speciﬁc
discount factors. We include our estimate of the liquidity constraints, Pr(denied credit) as a
regressor to control for the shadow price of borrowing an extra dollar, 푙푛(1 + 휆ℎ,푡+1). Since this
variable was estimated based on direct information on constraints from the SCF data, it indicates
the probability of a household being constrained in the last 5 years, rather than a probability of
being constrained between period 푡 and 푡+1. We also control for the possibility that labor decisions
are not separable from the marginal utility of consumption by including the change in the total
number of hours worked by the head of the household and by their partner.15
To address endogeneity that arises due to presence of second and higher-order terms in the
residual, it is typical to estimate the model using as instruments information known at time 푡.16
Since the instrument set includes lagged terms of all the parameters in the Euler equation, it violates
strict exogeneity assumptions required by the IV estimator. Additionally, as pointed out by Nickell
[1981] estimated coeﬃcients under within estimator together with predetermined regressors will
give biased and inconsistent results. One more problem we encounter is the limited temporal size
of our sample. In fact, on average we have only 5 periods per households, with 10 being the
maximum. Thus, our sample is short and highly unbalanced.
To get consistent estimates, we use forward orthogonal deviations transform in order to purge
our data from ﬁxed eﬀects proposed by Arellano and Bover [1995]. We use orthogonal transfor-
15The inclusion of the information on the labor supply decision is important for the identiﬁcation purposes, see
Attanasio [1999].
16See Attanasio and Low [2004] for a detailed discussion of issues involved in estimating log linearized Euler
equations.
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mation instead of ﬁrst diﬀerences, as forward transform reduces the loss of observations when the
data is highly unbalanced. Instead of subtracting the previous observation from the contemporane-
ous one, forward transform subtracts the average of all future available observations of a variable.
Thus it minimizes data loss, and since lagged observations don’t enter the formula, they become
valid instruments. We perform a two-step AB-GMM estimation that allows for heteroskedasticity
and intragroup correlation. We also make the Windmeijer ﬁnite-sample correction to the reported
standard errors in two-step estimation, without which those standard errors tend to be severely
downward biased. Too many instruments will not compromise the coeﬃcient estimates but will
weaken the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. In addition, too many instrument
can overﬁt endogenous variables.17 We limit the number of instruments to one lag, in order to
reduce the potential eﬃciency loss this type of GMM estimators could suﬀer. We use second lag
of the explanatory variables, plus marginal tax rate, as our instruments. Since probability of being
constrained refers to a 5 year period, between 푡−3 and 푡+1, to instrument for liquidity constraints,
we use information on probability of being denied credit from 푡− 4 and information on race of the
household, and whether a household is a welfare recipient.
Table 9 reports our coeﬃcient estimates. Columns (1) to (2) provide estimates using pooled
OLS, (3) to (4) using LSDV and ﬁnally columns (5) to (7) the Arellano and Bover [1995] estima-
tor. The AB-GMM estimator is consistent, but it is not in general unbiased, as in ﬁnite samples
the instruments are not in general perfectly uncorrelated with the endogenous components of the
instrumented regressors. Column (5) provides a AB-GMM estimator that does not control for
liquidity constraints or for nonseparabilities of preferences. Column (6) allows for nonseparabilities
of preferences. Column (7) is our preferred estimation as it controls for probability of being denied
credit. Column (8) includes both nonseparabilities and liquidity constraints. Our estimate of in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is consistent with other studies and is estimated to be
around 1.18 As can be seen from the table, all the necessary tests for the consistency of our esti-
mation are passed. Speciﬁcally, we fail to reject the null for both the Sargan test (p-value=0.569)
and the Hansen test (p-value=0.198) of overidentiﬁcation restrictions.
17See for example Roodman [2009] on the problems too many instruments could cause this type of GMM estimator.
18See for example Attanasio and Weber [1995], Attanasio [1999], and Attanasio and Low [2004].
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4.2 Evolution of Consumption Risk
To compute volatility of household consumption, we ﬁrst predict residuals from the above Euler
equation (8):
푧ˆℎ,푡+1 = Δ푙푛퐹ℎ,푡+1 −
[ 1
1− (1− 훾ˆ)(훼ˆ+ 훽ˆ)
[
Δ휃ℎ,푡+1 + 푙푛(1 + 푟ℎ,푡+1) + 푙푛(1 + 휆ℎ,푡+1)
]
−
1
1− (1− 훾ˆ)(훼ˆ+ 훽ˆ)
[
Δ푙푛푝퐹푡+1 + 훼ˆ(1− 훾ˆ)(Δ푙푛푝
푂
푡+1 −Δ푙푛푝
퐹
푡+1)
]]
(9)
We then subtract out household ﬁxed eﬀects 휅ℎ, thus subtracting out household speciﬁc discount
factors that are not directly computed by AB-GMM estimator, and time ﬁxed eﬀects 휏푡, to center
our estimator. We construct consumption volatility parameter as the square of the residual minus
휅ℎ + 휏푡, such that:
휅ˆℎ =
1
푇ℎ
푇ℎ∑
푡=1
푧ˆℎ,푡+1 (10)
푒ˆℎ,푡+1 = 푧ˆℎ,푡+1 − 휅ˆℎ
휏ˆ푡 =
1
퐻푡
퐻푡∑
ℎ=1
푒ˆℎ,푡+1 (11)
휍ˆℎ,푡+1
2
= (푒ˆℎ,푡 − 휏ˆ푡)
2 (12)
We run pooled OLS regression on a time trend to study whether volatility of consumption,
휍ˆℎ,푡+1
2
, changed over this time period.
휍ˆ2ℎ,푡+1 = 훽0 + 훽1푡+ 휔ℎ,푡+1 (13)
where 훽0 reﬂects the average variance of the measurement error, which we assumed to be stationary
and household speciﬁc. If the constant is well estimated, we can then analyze volatility changes in
addition to its levels.
Ultimately we are interested in analyzing how the increase in income volatility aﬀected household
welfare. Thus, looking at the volatility of food consumption is not enough, since volatility of food
consumption is a lower bound of the volatility of nondurable consumption. This statement is true
if the relationship between food and nondurable consumption can be approximated by a linear
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function, and since food consumption has a lower income elasticity than that elasticity for total
nondurable consumption, its volatility will also be lower.
Blundell et al. [2008], use Consumer Expenditure Survey, which has detailed information on all
consumption goods, and estimate demand for food as a function of nondurable expenditure, relative
prices, and a host of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the household. They model
food expenditure and total expenditure as jointly endogenous and allow this relationship to change
over time. Under monotonicity (normality) of food demand, this function can be inverted to obtain a
measure of nondurable consumption in the PSID. They ﬁnd that the elasticity of food expenditure
with respect to nondurable expenditure does change over time (testing for joint signiﬁcance of
time varying coeﬃcients, they get p-value=0.06), but they ﬁnd that none of the time coeﬃcients
are individually signiﬁcant. They estimate budget elasticity at 0.85. Thus, 1 percent change in
nondurable expenditure, will lead to a 0.85 percent change in expenditure on food. Translating
this into volatility terms, we get that 1 percent increase in volatility of food consumption means
a 1/(0.85)2 = 1.38 percent increase in nondurable consumption volatility. If we also account for a
fact that the elasticity changes over time, and that the change appears to be positive, this number
would be even larger.
Figure 6: Change in Mean Volatility with respect to 1984.
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Figure 6 illustrates that household volatility of food consumption was, as we would expect, lower
than that of family income volatility, and that it increased over the 1984 - 2004 period. Comparing
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Tables 6 and 10, we see that the trend in volatility of consumption is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, though it is slightly lower than the trend in volatility of family income. Unlike family
income volatility, consumption volatility for single parents and welfare recipients (those receiving
AFDC/TANF and/or Food Stamps beneﬁts) did not change, although it remained at very high
levels, at 23 percent for welfare recipients, vs. 14 for non recipients; and at 16 percent for single
parents vs. 12 for married households. Thus, public transfers seemed to have played an important
role in mitigating income shocks for some households. Nevertheless, recent work by Moﬃtt and
Scholz [2009] ﬁnd that very poor single parent and two-parent households experienced declines
in public expenditures, driven largely by lower recipient rates, beneﬁt receipts, or both in the
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps programs. Their study documents that there was a redistribution
of income from the very poor to near-poor and nonpoor households, as the later group experienced
an increase in beneﬁts over 1984 to 2004 time period. Thus, although volatility did not increase
for the already disadvantaged groups, the fact that it did not fall indicates that there is scope for
government intervention.
On average, education did not play an important role, as volatility of consumption increased
in the same way for both well and poorly educated households, i.e. those with more than 12 years
of education vs. those with less education. On the other hand, race was much more signiﬁcant, as
on average, nonwhite households experienced an economically and statistically higher increase in
volatility of consumption than white households, 35 percent (or 6ppts.) vs. 34 percent (or 4ppts),
respectively. In addition, we document that nonwhite households with no more than a high school
diploma experienced a much higher increase in volatility of consumption than white households
with the same level of education, 49 percent (or 7ppts.) vs. 32 percent (or 3ppts.), respectively.
Well educated households saw an increase in volatility that was the same across racial groups, rising
by 5ppts.
These diﬀerences might be explained by the availability of credit and other smoothing op-
portunities available to diﬀerent types of households. In fact, it is not surprising that nonwhite
households were less able to smooth out shocks to income as nonwhite households are typically
households with low asset holdings that are also more likely to be liquidity constrained. Figure 7
shows that, using the SCF data, in 2004, 25 percent of nonwhite households had net assets lower
than 2 months of income, in comparison to 35 percent in 1983. Thus, even though the holdings of
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Figure 7: Percent of Households with net assets less than two months of income.
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net assets increased even for nonwhite households, the share with low net assets remained signif-
icantly higher than that for white households, for whom this percentage remained constant at 10
percent over this period. Nonwhite households are also much more likely to be denied credit, and
as Figure 9 in the Appendix illustrates, this probability did not improve much over the period.
4.3 Constrained and Unconstrained Households
Next we analyze what role, if any, was played by liquidity constraints. Tables 6 and 11 illustrate
that liquidity constraints played an important role in propagating shocks to income. Volatility
of household consumption was signiﬁcantly higher for households that had a higher probability
of being denied credit, these households experienced a 42 percent (or 5ppts) increase in volatility
of consumption, vs. 32 percent (or 3ppts) felt by unconstrained households. This increase was
statistically smaller than the increase in income volatility for these groups. Volatility of family
income increased by 52 percent (or 11ppts) for constrained and by 42 percent (or 6ppts) for liq-
uidity unconstrained households. Public transfers played an important role in helping constrained
households to smooth income shocks, conditional on the household being a recipient. We esti-
mate that if a household was liquidity constrained in a previous period (푃푟(퐷푒푛푖푒푑퐶푟푒푑푖푡)푡−1),
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it received on average, 2,400 dollars (in 1983 terms) of public transfers in period 푡. On the other
hand, liquidity constrained households that were not recipients of welfare beneﬁts, experienced a
signiﬁcant increase in volatility of consumption. This ﬁnding indicates that transitory shocks to
income increased substantially over the period.19
Poorly educated constrained households experienced a signiﬁcant increase in consumption volatil-
ity of 42 percent, whereas for unconstrained households with the same level of education, consump-
tion volatility remained unchanged. This observation again contrasts with the trends in family
income volatility. Family income volatility for constrained poorly educated households went up by
52 percent, and by 42 percent for unconstrained households. On the other hand, family income
volatility increased by much more for well educated households, it went up by 82 percent for con-
strained and by 62 percent for the unconstrained households. Food consumption volatility also
went up for these households, though there was no statistical diﬀerence between constrained and
unconstrained households, for both types volatility increased by 47 percent.
Nonwhite households, whether constrained or not, did not experience an increase in volatility of
household consumption, though volatility for those households remained very high at 19 percent for
constrained and 16 percent for unconstrained households. Family income volatility disaggregated
by race also did not show a diﬀerential trend, though it did increased by 41 percent. Unfortunately,
we do not have enough observations to have a meaningful further disaggregation of data.
5 Conclusions
Despite the extraordinary increase in US household debt over the past quarter-century, consumers
are no less likely to be denied credit in 2007 than they were in 1983. Financial sector innovations
such as credit scoring and risk-based pricing have surely increased borrowing limits for at least some
consumers, and may have contributed to the near-tripling of household debt, but they have not
prevented around 1 in 5 households from being denied credit. One explanation for this apparent
paradox is that the demand for debt has increased in line with the supply, due to historically low
19Finding supported by large research literature that disaggregates income volatility into transitory and permanent
components and ﬁnds that both increased over the period. See for example, See for example Moﬃtt and Gottschalk
[1994, 1998, 2002], Gottschalk and Moﬃtt [2009], Dynarski and Gruber [1997], Haider [2001], Hacker [2006], Dynan
et al. [2007], Keys [2008], Shin and Solon [2008], Jensen and Shore [2008].
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real interest rates, increasing house prices and increased income volatility.
We estimate income volatility for family, labor, public transfers, and other income categories.
We ﬁnd that total labor income volatility was high but did not increase over the period. On the
other hand, volatility of family income increased substantially, rising by 43 percent between 1984
and 2004. The biggest increase in family income volatility was experienced by households that were
welfare recipients and nonwhites with poor education. Like family income volatility, volatility of
household consumption also increased, rising by 34 percent between 1984 and 2004. The increase
was particularly high for nonwhite households, particularly those with low education. On the other
hand, welfare recipients did not see an increase in consumption volatility.
Liquidity constraints also played an important role in household’s lives. We ﬁnd that already
disadvantaged households were unable to smooth out shocks to their income. Given a typical con-
sumption model, this increase in volatility of consumption has an obvious welfare cost, as it comes
not from the choices made by the households, but from inability of households to smooth consump-
tion. Using the simplest back of the envelope calculation, we ﬁnd that an average household would
be willing to sacriﬁce 2.35 percent of their annual nondurable consumption to reduce consumption
risk back to where it was in 1984. We use a simple formula derived from Lucas [1987], where the
cost of business cycle can be approximated by 휇 = 1
2
훾휎2푐 . Volatility of household food consumption
was 0.114 in 1984 and went up to 0.148 by 2004, and our estimate of relative risk aversion 훾 = 1.
Thus, the cost is 1.7 percent of household food consumption per year. Since, the elasticity of food
expenditure with respect to expenditure on nondurables is 0.85, consumers would be willing to
sacriﬁce 2.35 percent of annual nondurable consumption to lower risk to its 1984 level. In 2004,
according to National Income and Product Accounts, total personal consumption expenditure was
8,285 billion dollars, thus, households were willing to sacriﬁce 195 billion dollars to lower consump-
tion risk. Given that the elasticity changes over time, and that the change appears to be positive,
this is a conservative estimate of the actual price. This is a substantial cost to society; to put
it in current economic terms: the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act package enacted in
February 2009 pledged 787 billion dollars to “jump-start the economy and to reduce the loss of
jobs”.
Given the shear scale of the problem, this is a hugely important and understudied question that
deserves greater attention from the academic community.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Supplementary Figures
Figure 8: Average mortgage vs. non-mortgage debt, in 1983 dollars
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Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
Figure 9: Proportion of constrained household, by demographic group
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Figure 10: Proportion of constrained household, by marital status
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Figure 11: Proportion of constrained household, by income quintile
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Figure 12: Estimated vs. Actual Probability of Being Denied Credit in SCF Data
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Figure 13: Proportion of constrained household, by demographic group in PSID
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Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for SCF data 
 1983   1989   1992   1995   
 All C UC All C UC All C UC All C UC 
Age 46.8 36.0 49.2 47.9 38.2 50.5 48.5 39.4 51.0 48.5 39.0 51.3 
Education 12.3 12.4 12.2 12.5 12.3 12.6 12.9 12.8 13.0 12.9 12.7 13.0 
% female 26.3 34.5 24.6 28.1 31.3 27.3 27.7 30.2 27.1 28.9 32.5 27.8 
% married 60.6 47.1 63.5 58.2 54.1 59.3 57.6 50.1 59.6 52.6 41.4 56.0 
% nonwhite 17.7 32.7 14.4 25.2 42.2 20.8 24.7 39.7 20.5 22.4 37.9 17.8 
Family size 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.5 
% homeowners 63.4 33.9 69.8 64.9 44.1 70.2 65.9 45.4 71.7 66.3 46.8 72.3 
# credit cards 3.3 1.7 3.6 4.0 2.7 4.3 3.7 2.6 4.0 4.0 2.5 4.4 
Family income 26,969 18,275 28,840 31,693 21,172 34,158 27,823 19,829 30,079 27,434 18,622 30,044 
Assets 193,424 68,449 219,785 174,822 68,255 201,902 157,794 72,396 181,846 164,318 62,274 194,839 
Net worth 120,206 36,877 137,670 153,762 50,382 180,012 135,262 54,613 158,014 140,465 43,408 169,482 
Debt 18,037 14,661 18,644 21,060 17,873 21,890 22,532 17,783 23,832 23,853 18,866 25,357 
% with debt 69.6 74.5 68.5 72.4 83.9 69.5 73.8 84.9 70.7 75.1 83.5 72.5 
% unemployed 5.6 11.8 4.3 3.1 6.6 2.3 4.1 6.2 3.5 2.8 6.1 1.8 
# observations 4,103 647 3,449 3,143 469 2,672 3,906 720 3,179 4,299 789 3,506 
             
 1998   2001   2004   2007   
 All C UC All C UC All C UC All C UC 
Age 48.7 38.9 51.6 49.0 39.5 51.6 49.5 40.3 52.2 50.0 40.8 52.5 
Education 13.1 12.8 13.1 13.1 12.7 13.2 13.3 12.7 13.4 13.3 12.7 13.5 
% female 28.0 31.8 26.9 26.8 34.2 24.7 28.0 34.8 26.1 27.6 35.0 25.7 
% married 52.3 43.4 54.9 53.1 39.7 56.9 50.8 37.9 54.6 51.1 39.5 54.3 
% nonwhite 22.3 35.4 18.5 23.8 41.0 19.0 26.4 41.3 22.0 26.1 40.8 22.1 
Family size 2.6 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.5 
% homeowners 67.0 44.4 73.5 68.3 42.3 75.5 70.0 48.0 76.4 69.4 48.2 75.2 
# credit cards 3.5 2.6 3.8 3.3 2.4 3.6 3.3 2.4 3.6 3.2 1.9 3.6 
Family income 31,004 21,242 33,754 36,679 20,687 41,152 35,138 20,539 39,338 38,960 20,914 43,858 
Assets 203,801 77,653 239,056 256,709 66,222 309,870 279,972 80,724 337,548 315,307 92,674 375,800 
Net worth 174,979 53,866 208,802 225,929 44,071 276,666 238,110 50,238 292,427 268,474 58,151 325,568 
Debt 28,822 23,788 30,254 30,781 22,151 33,204 41,863 30,486 45,120 46,833 34,522 50,231 
% with debt 74.6 84.3 71.8 75.6 83.4 73.4 76.8 82.3 75.1 77.2 83.1 75.6 
% unemployed 3.1 5.3 2.4 2.4 3.8 2.0 2.8 5.4 2.0 3.1 5.7 2.4 
# observations 4,305 800 3,498 4,442 789 3,649 4,519 850 3,663 4,418 733 3,679 
All refers to the whole sample, C refers to constrained households, U refers to unconstrained households. All means are calculated using the survey weights. All values are in 
1983 US dollars. 
Table 2: Estimating Probability of Being Denied Credit on 1983 sample, with survey weights 
 
Dependent Variable Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|     Dependent Variable Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
age 0.18 0.11 0.09    nonwhite*unemployed 7.10 1.41 0.00 
age2 0.00 0.00 0.14    nonwhite*keephouse 6.63 1.41 0.00 
1930<year of birth<1936 -1.17 0.73 0.11    nonwhite*homeowner 0.59 0.19 0.00 
1935<year of birth<1941 -1.19 0.65 0.07    adults==2 -0.17 0.11 0.13 
1945<year of birth<1951 -0.90 0.51 0.08    eduHS 7.35 0.74 0.00 
1950<year of birth<1956 0.18 0.39 0.65    edHS*working -7.65 0.55 0.00 
Single Parent 0.24 0.13 0.07    edHS*unemp -6.22 0.62 0.00 
female -4.14 0.83 0.00    edCol 0.25 0.78 0.75 
female*edHS 5.24 0.27 0.00    edColp -5.71 0.50 0.00 
female*edCol 4.88 0.28 0.00    edColp*(1930<yb<1936) -1.26 0.72 0.08 
female*edColp 5.52 0.36 0.00    edColp*(1946>yb>1940) -1.36 0.60 0.02 
female*widow -0.63 0.31 0.04    edCol*(1950<yb<1956) -0.53 0.38 0.16 
female*(kids>=3) -0.24 0.30 0.42    edColp*(1950<yb<1956) -1.07 0.57 0.06 
female*(yb<1926) -0.11 0.51 0.83    welfare*(1941>yb>1935) -1.85 0.72 0.01 
female*nonwhite*coh1 0.08 0.91 0.93    welfare*(1946>yb>1940) -1.14 0.64 0.08 
female*(1931>yb>1925) -1.14 0.45 0.01    unemployed*(kids==1) -0.50 0.35 0.15 
female*nonwhite*(1941>yb>1935) 1.30 0.84 0.12    unemployed*(1946>yb>1940) -1.11 0.71 0.12 
female*(1946>yb>1940) -0.59 0.37 0.12    unemployed*(1950<yb<1956) -1.27 0.69 0.06 
female*(1950<yb<1956) -0.66 0.35 0.06    ln(family income) -6.71 6.27 0.29 
nonwhite -7.36 1.50 0.00    asset income 0.76 0.35 0.03 
nonwhite*ednoHS 1.05 0.39 0.01    ln(asset income)^2 0.02 0.01 0.11 
nonwhite*edHS -0.55 0.24 0.02    ln(house value) 0.15 0.08 0.06 
nonwhite*edCollege 0.90 0.39 0.02    ln(house value)^2 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
nonwhite*working 6.85 1.39 0.00    technical industry 0.28 0.11 0.01 
       service industry 0.43 0.14 0.00 
Number of observations               2,370       constant 13.03 19.23 0.50 
Population size       52,225,138           
F(138,2232)                   
 
Note: the table provide information only on statistically significant variables to minimize the number of variables presented, a full table for all the years is available upon 
request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: P-values for a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the selected variable are constant over time. 
 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2  Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Age 0.16 0.15  Log asset income 0.85 0.83 
Age2 0.3 0.29  (Log asset income)2 0.81 0.72 
Female 0.33 0.21  Any asset income? 0.66 0.65 
Nonwhite 0.9 0.83  Annual rent pay’ts 0.29  
# adults 0.91 0.88  Mortgage pay’t 0  
# children 0.96 0.95  (Mortgage pay’t)2  0  
Single parent 0.48 0.44  Managers/profess. 0.7 0.8 
Married 0.54 0.46  Technical, sales, admin    0.12 0.08 
Some HS 0.11 0.1  Service 0.68 0.66 
Completed HS 0.8 0.72  Precision production, craft, repair 0.44 0.41 
Some college 0.67 0.46  Operators, fabricators 0.49 0.45 
College degree 0.38 0.21  Farmers 0.27 0.25 
Graduate degree 0.62 0.64  Checking account? 0.66 0.68 
Business income 0.19 0.21  Borrow for vacation? 0.9 0.93 
Receive welfare 0.93 0.94  Borrow for income cut? 0.27 0.22 
# credit cards  0.02   Borrow for fur coat? 0.2 0.28 
Wealth x10-5 0.05   Borrow for car? 0.56 0.64 
Homeowner 0.29   Borrow for education? 0.42 0.49 
House value x10- 0.01   Loan problems 0 0 
Debt x10-5 0   Owned home >5yrs? 0.26 0.19 
Mortgage x10-5 0.42   Expect inheritance 0.15 0.14 
Log income 0.4 0.24  Constant 0.4 0.23 
(Log income)2 0.41 0.26     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics: SCF vs. PSID samples.
SCF PSID SCF PSID SCF PSID SCF PSID SCF PSID SCF PSID SCF PSID SCF PSID
1983 41.36 39.74 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.09 12.87 13.51 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.17 0.13 31,502       33,899       
1989 41.34 39.30 0.22 0.18 0.25 0.11 13.18 13.34 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.09 37,625       30,381       
1992 41.54 40.68 0.22 0.16 0.26 0.10 13.53 13.74 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.07 33,734       38,759       
1995 41.65 40.31 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.11 13.48 13.36 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.01 32,540       30,202     
1998 42.13 42.60 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.11 13.51 13.77 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.02 37,148       42,222      
2000 42.95 0.17 0.10 13.76 0.02 0.03 0.02    44,041       
2001 42.85 0.23 0.25 13.61 0.04 0.03 0.11 43,601    
2002 43.33 0.17 0.11 13.71 0.03 0.04 0.10    41,140       
2004 43.27 44.55 0.23 0.15 0.28 0.10 13.69 13.74 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.10 42,000       43,598       
Education% nonwhite% femaleAge % on welfare % unemployed % with business income Family income
Table. 5 Volatility of Labour Income, biennial sample, 1984-2004
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year/1000 -1.005 0.603 -1.413 0.391 -1.838* -2.239 1.293 5.106 12.716 15.653 -0.683 0.377
(0.965) (1.819) (5.638) (6.008) (1.091) (2.352) (2.179) (3.253) (9.195) (9.629) (0.928) (1.761)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -1.799 -16.442 2.127 -10.888*** -16.946 -1.050
(2.081) (17.183) (2.583) (4.134) (27.241) (2.021)
Unconstrained 3.414 32.646 -4.396 21.544*** 33.888 1.951
(4.151) (34.330) (5.151) (8.248) (54.312) (4.031)
Constant 2.301 -0.802 3.286 -0.298 3.937* 4.839 -2.241 -9.767 -24.231 -30.106 1.639 -0.388
(1.926) (3.628) (11.251) (11.989) (2.177) (4.691) (4.346) (6.487) (18.337) (19.200) (1.851) (3.513)
Observations 19177 19177 898 898 14208 14208 4071 4071 442 442 18735 18735
R-squared 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.015 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.009
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Year/1000 -3.068* -3.625 1.249 4.971** -0.012 0.891 -1.094 0.383 2.660 4.417 0.370 -0.239 -3.710** -5.601* 1.022 5.040*
(1.644) (2.774) (1.132) (2.314) (3.951) (4.821) (0.980) (1.948) (5.941) (7.043) (4.794) (6.135) (1.668) (2.956) (1.186) (2.580)
Unconstrained*year/1000 0.935 -4.780* -3.470 -1.519 -9.917 3.785 3.098 -4.916*
(3.308) (2.598) (7.361) (2.203) (11.972) (7.197) (3.472) (2.858)
Unconstrained -2.071 9.402* 6.683 2.875 19.517 -7.766 -6.361 9.687*
(6.600) (5.180) (14.691) (4.394) (23.883) (14.357) (6.929) (5.697)
Constant 6.470** 7.691 -2.241 -9.577** 0.461 -1.289 2.463 -0.385 -4.802 -8.252 -0.380 0.887 7.730** 11.607** -1.796 -9.729*
(3.280) (5.534) (2.257) (4.613) (7.884) (9.621) (1.956) (3.885) (11.852) (14.051) (9.567) (12.240) (3.327) (5.898) (2.366) (5.142)
Observations 8290 8290 10887 10887 1820 1820 17357 17357 1015 1015 767 767 7275 7275 9777 9777
R-squared 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.007
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: We define household in year t as being unconstrained if its probability of being denied credit is below the average probability of being denied credit in that particular year.
all single parents married other
Education<13 Education>12 Nonwhite White White, Edu<13 White, Edu>12
on welfare not on welfare
Nonwhite, Edu<13 Nonwhite, Edu>12
Table. 6 Volatility of Family Income, biennial sample, 1984-2004
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year/1000 3.933*** 5.679*** 1.680 2.328 3.645*** 5.143*** 4.530*** 4.787** 8.746** 10.106** 3.993*** 5.464***
(0.590) (1.025) (3.174) (3.394) (0.618) (1.179) (1.578) (2.253) (4.154) (4.502) (0.585) (1.028)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -2.584** -6.244 -1.661 -2.370 -16.001* -2.124*
(1.212) (7.174) (1.356) (2.970) (9.487) (1.213)
Unconstrained 5.057** 12.396 3.246 4.630 31.817* 4.158*
(2.416) (14.318) (2.702) (5.923) (18.912) (2.419)
Constant -7.622*** -11.049*** -3.001 -4.289 -7.080*** -10.024*** -8.737*** -9.207** -16.901** -19.606** -7.753*** -10.639***
(1.176) (2.042) (6.330) (6.769) (1.232) (2.348) (3.147) (4.493) (8.278) (8.973) (1.167) (2.048)
Observations 21874 21874 1181 1181 15922 15922 4771 4771 730 730 21144 21144
R-squared 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.009
33
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Year/1000 3.218*** 4.116*** 4.798*** 7.352*** 3.812* 5.146** 3.902*** 5.718*** 8.143** 10.727*** -0.459 -1.425 2.437** 2.208 5.005*** 8.963***
(0.953) (1.438) (0.745) (1.471) (2.086) (2.419) (0.612) (1.128) (3.168) (3.549) (2.403) (2.870) (0.980) (1.535) (0.794) (1.727)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -1.928 -3.408** -5.465 -2.487* -14.381* 4.929 0.303 -5.200***
(1.884) (1.631) (4.606) (1.302) (7.311) (4.565) (1.967) (1.862)
Unconstrained 3.748 6.708** 10.793 4.869* 28.542* -9.904 -0.689 10.283***
(3.756) (3.250) (9.194) (2.594) (14.589) (9.112) (3.921) (3.710)
Constant -6.169*** -7.913*** -9.368*** -14.406*** -7.319* -9.957** -7.567*** -11.132*** -15.926** -21.054*** 1.162 3.106 -4.623** -4.118 -9.787*** -17.621***
(1.899) (2.866) (1.484) (2.931) (4.159) (4.821) (1.220) (2.249) (6.312) (7.069) (4.796) (5.729) (1.954) (3.060) (1.581) (3.441)
Observations 9595 9595 12279 12279 2255 2255 19619 19619 1278 1278 920 920 8317 8317 10910 10910
R-squared 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.007 0.019 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.012
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: We define household in year t as being unconstrained if its probability of being denied credit is below the average probability of being denied credit in that particular year.
all single parents married other on welfare not on welfare
Education<13 Education>12 Nonwhite White Nonwhite, Edu<13 Nonwhite, Edu>12 White, Edu<13 White, Edu>12
Table. 7 Volatility of Public Transfer Income, biennial sample, 1984-2004
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year/1000 -0.046 1.349 -6.838 -6.210 -0.716 0.480 3.464** 3.891 0.207 -2.478 0.781 2.517**
(0.737) (1.435) (6.432) (6.795) (0.755) (1.515) (1.587) (2.669) (5.534) (6.481) (0.580) (1.238)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -1.729 -6.662 -0.867 -2.726 6.858 -2.384*
(1.598) (18.838) (1.687) (3.198) (11.692) (1.341)
Unconstrained 3.344 13.255 1.657 5.366 -13.684 4.680*
(3.189) (37.638) (3.366) (6.384) (23.319) (2.676)
Constant 0.220 -2.500 14.007 12.757 1.526 -0.809 -6.742** -7.559 0.294 5.652 -1.473 -4.888**
(1.471) (2.864) (12.844) (13.568) (1.508) (3.022) (3.168) (5.330) (11.040) (12.935) (1.159) (2.470)
Observations 15996 15996 811 811 11658 11658 3527 3527 1054 1054 14942 14942
R-squared 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Year/1000 -1.661 0.437 1.700** 2.382 1.524 2.788 -0.278 0.735 2.610 4.404 2.768 2.961 -2.315 -0.849 1.419* 1.723
(1.431) (2.409) (0.717) (1.541) (3.102) (3.739) (0.740) (1.524) (4.797) (5.671) (3.153) (3.636) (1.462) (2.596) (0.744) (1.721)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -3.957 -0.492 -4.344 -1.091 -11.585 1.165 -2.473 0.115
(2.819) (1.693) (5.979) (1.677) (8.332) (7.358) (2.992) (1.858)
Unconstrained 7.777 0.904 8.531 2.091 22.917 -2.401 4.848 -0.298
(5.628) (3.377) (11.941) (3.347) (16.643) (14.689) (5.973) (3.706)
Constant 3.495 -0.629 -3.304** -4.612 -2.789 -5.283 0.668 -1.297 -4.891 -8.434 -5.367 -5.735 4.778 1.902 -2.750* -3.309
(2.857) (4.808) (1.431) (3.075) (6.193) (7.463) (1.476) (3.043) (9.575) (11.318) (6.292) (7.255) (2.919) (5.184) (1.485) (3.433)
Observations 6599 6599 9397 9397 1616 1616 14380 14380 910 910 672 672 5689 5689 8412 8412
R-squared 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.008
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: We define household in year t as being unconstrained if its probability of being denied credit is below the average probability of being denied credit in that particular year.
all single parents married other
Education<13 Education>12 Nonwhite White White, Edu<13 White, Edu>12
on welfare not on welfare
Nonwhite, Edu<13 Nonwhite, Edu>12
Table. 8 Volatility of Family Income minus Labour Income minus Public Transfers, biennial sample, 1984-2004
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year/1000 13.573*** 14.559*** 13.236* 12.878* 15.477*** 16.293*** 7.309 8.305 11.773* 21.818** 14.067*** 13.246***
(2.430) (3.717) (7.156) (7.638) (2.893) (5.074) (5.300) (7.646) (6.503) (8.645) (2.599) (4.053)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -2.310 0.371 -3.336 0.022 -21.695* 0.643
(4.829) (21.150) (6.111) (10.581) (12.892) (5.182)
Unconstrained 4.789 -0.678 6.857 0.030 43.419* -1.087
(9.636) (42.203) (12.192) (21.124) (25.727) (10.341)
Constant -26.188*** -28.267*** -25.685* -24.977 -29.970*** -31.734*** -13.702 -15.727 -22.519* -42.624** -27.186*** -25.673***
(4.850) (7.416) (14.273) (15.233) (5.773) (10.119) (10.581) (15.270) (12.976) (17.244) (5.187) (8.088)
Observations 10838 10838 611 611 7927 7927 2300 2300 1418 1418 9420 9420
R-squared 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.008
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Year/1000 11.337*** 20.520*** 14.301*** 7.955 11.477 14.334* 13.807*** 14.607*** 3.878 12.212 20.172 17.669 12.430*** 23.040*** 14.037*** 3.577
(3.589) (4.811) (3.295) (5.702) (8.066) (8.241) (2.548) (4.165) (10.117) (9.206) (13.512) (15.686) (3.840) (5.616) (3.440) (6.071)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -16.653** 8.444 -18.007 -1.865 -43.994 6.392 -17.492** 13.462*
(7.034) (6.845) (23.467) (5.190) (35.250) (29.506) (7.608) (7.204)
Unconstrained 33.401** -16.694 36.267 3.898 88.178 -12.611 35.061** -26.678*
(14.036) (13.661) (46.872) (10.357) (70.398) (58.919) (15.179) (14.377)
Constant -21.798*** -40.215*** -27.588*** -15.031 -22.042 -27.809* -26.651*** -28.366*** -6.954 -23.656 -39.283 -34.321 -23.973*** -45.238*** -27.061*** -6.322
(7.161) (9.596) (6.577) (11.378) (16.098) (16.440) (5.085) (8.311) (20.190) (18.364) (26.969) (31.296) (7.662) (11.202) (6.866) (12.115)
Observations 4611 4611 6227 6227 1048 1048 9790 9790 587 587 443 443 4024 4024 5612 5612
R-squared 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.011 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.018 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.008
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: We define household in year t as being unconstrained if its probability of being denied credit is below the average probability of being denied credit in that particular year.
all single parents married other
Education<13 Education>12 Nonwhite White White, Edu<13 White, Edu>12
on welfare not on welfare
Nonwhite, Edu<13 Nonwhite, Edu>12
Table 9. Euler Equation Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS LSDV LSDV AB_GMM AB_GMM AB_GMM AB_GMM
Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 0.001 -0.116** 0.003 -0.116*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.049) (0.002) (0.066)
Real Interest Rate 0.092 -0.160 -0.021 0.059 1.759*** 3.378*** 1.823*** 3.737***
(0.152) (0.175) (0.221) (0.242) (0.534) (1.096) (0.668) (1.438)
Change in Number of Adults 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.148** 0.148**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058)
Change in Number of Kids 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.093 0.136 0.207 0.211
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.131) (0.124) (0.172) (0.171)
Change in Marital Status -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025** -0.023** -0.045 -0.053 -0.043 -0.057
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.049)
Change in Hours Worked, Wife 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Change in Hours Worked, Head 0.013** 0.013** 0.010 0.009 -0.027 -0.028 -0.012 -0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041)
Precautionary Savings -0.001 0.004 0.015 0.016 -0.139* -0.126 -0.167** -0.170**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.084) (0.081) (0.083) (0.082)
Price Differential -0.045*** 0.173 3.353** 0.445
(0.016) (0.182) (1.394) (0.430)
Pr(Denied Credit) -0.145*** -0.232** 0.982** 3.397*
(0.034) (0.091) (0.447) (1.883)
Constant 0.052 0.337*** 0.116 -0.419
(0.042) (0.087) (0.085) (0.624)
Observations 20808 20808 20808 20808 16652 16652 16652 16652
R-squared 0.053 0.054 0.176 0.177
Number of clusters 4120 4120 4120 4120 3582 3582 3582 3582
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(1) -25.25 -25.27 -24.22 -24.07
Pr>z 0 0 0 0
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(2) 6.837 6.734 6.330 6.381
Pr>z 0 0 0 0
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(3) -0.691 -0.728 -0.374 -0.560
Pr>z 0.489 0.466 0.709 0.575
Sargan test of overid 21.38 30.90 15.85 19.07
df 20 22 12 13
Prob>chi2 0.375 0.0982 0.569 0.121
Hansen test of overid 14.45 21.97 10.54 13.36
df 20 22 12 13
Prob>chi2 0.807 0.461 0.198 0.421
Number of Instruments 31 34 24 26
F-stat 7.543 6.387 6.840 5.963
Prob>F 0 0 0 0
Avg num obs 4.649 4.649 4.649 4.649
max num obs 10 10 10 10
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 10. Volatility of Food Consumption, biennial sample, 1984-2004
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year/1000 1.979*** 2.648*** 1.889 2.296 1.379*** 1.591** 3.417*** 2.749** 1.441 2.187 2.073*** 2.760***
(0.395) (0.638) (1.708) (1.765) (0.437) (0.790) (0.943) (1.293) (3.494) (3.906) (0.392) (0.620)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -0.930 -5.146 -0.159 1.029 -6.472 -0.966
(0.785) (6.867) (0.924) (1.875) (7.158) (0.771)
Unconstrained 1.826 10.284 0.303 -2.083 12.878 1.901
(1.565) (13.703) (1.841) (3.736) (14.255) (1.537)
Constant -3.810*** -5.127*** -3.609 -4.421 -2.630*** -3.042* -6.627*** -5.280** -2.647 -4.133 -4.001*** -5.355***
(0.788) (1.271) (3.405) (3.518) (0.871) (1.575) (1.879) (2.580) (6.960) (7.782) (0.781) (1.236)
Observations 17261 17261 826 826 12816 12816 3619 3619 387 387 16874 16874
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Year/1000 1.848*** 2.590*** 2.143*** 2.714*** 2.640* 2.450 1.910*** 2.626*** 3.498* 4.092* 2.504 1.118 1.660** 2.231** 2.312*** 3.040***
(0.642) (0.980) (0.498) (0.819) (1.472) (1.671) (0.409) (0.688) (2.000) (2.459) (2.295) (2.294) (0.677) (1.058) (0.526) (0.930)
Unconstrained*year/1000 -1.321 -0.654 0.962 -0.973 -2.930 5.585 -0.944 -0.865
(1.243) (0.997) (3.447) (0.825) (3.379) (5.962) (1.318) (1.091)
Unconstrained 2.609 1.274 -1.950 1.918 5.804 -11.165 1.862 1.702
(2.477) (1.988) (6.867) (1.644) (6.740) (11.873) (2.627) (2.173)
Constant -3.542*** -5.008** -4.143*** -5.261*** -5.087* -4.700 -3.677*** -5.090*** -6.796* -7.973 -4.812 -2.041 -3.172** -4.300** -4.482*** -5.917***
(1.279) (1.952) (0.994) (1.632) (2.935) (3.333) (0.815) (1.371) (3.986) (4.900) (4.574) (4.577) (1.349) (2.109) (1.049) (1.852)
Observations 7223 7223 10038 10038 1602 1602 15659 15659 869 869 700 700 6354 6354 9010 9010
R-squared 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: We define household in year t as being unconstrained if its probability of being denied credit is below the average probability of being denied credit in that particular year.
all single parents married other
Education<13 Education>12 Nonwhite White White, Edu<13 White, Edu>12
on welfare not on welfare
Nonwhite, Edu<13 Nonwhite, Edu>12
Table 11. Volatility of Food Consumption: constrained vs. unconstrained households, biennial sample, 1984-2004
VARIABLES C UC C UC C UC C UC C UC C UC C UC
Year/1000 2.648*** 1.718*** 2.296 -2.851 1.379*** 1.379*** 2.450 3.412 2.626*** 1.653*** 2.187 -4.285 2.760*** 1.794***
(0.638) (0.488) (1.764) (6.732) (0.437) (0.437) (1.671) (3.032) (0.688) (0.493) (3.897) (6.144) (0.620) (0.489)
Constant -5.127*** -3.301*** -4.421 5.863 -2.630*** -2.630*** -4.700 -6.650 -5.090*** -3.172*** -4.133 8.745 -5.355*** -3.454***
(1.271) (0.972) (3.514) (13.433) (0.871) (0.871) (3.332) (6.038) (1.371) (0.982) (7.765) (12.233) (1.236) (0.974)
Observations 6772 10489 748 78 12816 12816 1245 357 5527 10132 335 52 6437 10437
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.002
VARIABLES C UC C UC C UC C UC C UC C UC
Year/1000 2.590*** 1.268 2.900*** 2.323*** 4.092* 1.162 1.118 6.702 2.231** 1.287 3.040*** 2.174***
(0.980) (0.810) (0.855) (0.630) (2.457) (2.351) (2.293) (5.524) (1.058) (0.842) (0.930) (0.625)
Constant -5.008** -2.399 -5.631*** -4.510*** -7.973 -2.169 -2.041 -13.205 -4.300** -2.438 -5.917*** -4.215***
(1.952) (1.615) (1.703) (1.256) (4.896) (4.695) (4.573) (10.999) (2.109) (1.679) (1.852) (1.246)
Observations 3373 3850 3270 6440 691 178 529 171 2682 3672 2741 6269
R-squared 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: We define household in year t as being unconstrained if its probability of being denied credit is below the average probability of being denied credit in that particular year.
white on welfare not on welfare
White, Edu<13 White, Edu>12
all single parents maried nonwhite
Education<13 Education>12 Nonwhite, Edu<13 Nonwhite, Edu>12
